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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-Partnership Employment
Decisions and a Forecast of Impact: Hishon v. King & Spalding

I. INTRODUCTION

In May 1984, the Supreme Court ruled in Hishon v. King & Spalding'
that law firm partnership employment decisions are within the purview
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under Title VII, an employer
is prohibited from discriminating against individuals on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 2 The Court's extension of Title
VII's coverage to partnerships allows a partnership employer continued
freedom of choice in selecting a partner, provided the decision is not
based on a statutorily prohibited form of invidious discrimination.3
Prior to Hishon, law partnership employers operated under a gauzy,
self-imposed, and court-protected immunity from Title VII in the selection
of partners, 4 despite a 1977 federal district court ruling that the purpose
1. 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (1984).
2. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has been codified in 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17
(1982) (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The "sex" category was not included in the Civil Rights Bill when it left the House Rules Committee
on January 30, 1964. See H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reported in 2 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2355 (1964); See also Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 431, 441 (1966). In an apparent attempt to assure the bill's defeat, a critic added the
term as a final sabotage effort. See Note, Hishon v. King & Spalding: May PartnersElude Title VII
When ConsideringAssociates for Partnership?,32 U. KAN. L. REV. 250, 253 n.30 (1983). See also
Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 462 n.4 (D.N.J. 1970); Vaas, supra at
441.
The term "sex" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) arguably is an ambiguous misnomer. The more
accurate term is "gender." For purposes of this article the two terms are used interchangeably.
3. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2235.
4. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (11 th Cit. 1982), rev'd and remanded,
104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). The court of appeals ruled that Title VII coverage was not so broad as to
include partnership decisions. In so doing, the court upheld the lower court's dismissal of Hishon's
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See also Bartholet, Application
of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1982). The federal district court's ruling
that a law firm's partnership selection is entirely immune from legislative prohibitions of discrim-

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

of Title VII was to eliminate job discrimination in all employment fields,
including the professions of law and medicine. 5 Law partnerships utilized
their status as voluntary associations under partnership law to acquire this
judicially sanctioned immunity from the Title VII mandates to which
public and corporate employers are subject. 6 The Hishon decision does
ination exemplifies judicial hostility to the application of Title VII to upper level employment
practices. See Bartholet, supra, at 960.
The courts have strongly implied that, while Title VII is applicable to both "blue" and "white"
collar jobs, upper level systems should be largely immune from Title VII coverage. Id. at 959.
Following this reasoning, several courts have held that Title VII applicability to upper level professional employers should be relaxed. Id. at 960. See also Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Center,
558 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (standards for validating advanced degree requirements for professional jobs should be relaxed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 370-75 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (validation standards should be relaxed at upper
level bank jobs); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972) (airline pilot
selection should involve a sliding-scale standard under which validation requirements would be
relaxed in relation to the importance of the job).
5. In Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the plaintiff, an
associate with the Cravath, Swaine & Moore law partnership, was terminated under an "up or out"
policy when the firm failed to promote him to partner. He alleged that the termination was a result
of discrimination against him due to national origin, or religion, or both. Id. at 127. He claimed
that the firm had represented to him that the partnership position was a "term, condition, or privilege
of employment" within the meaning of Title VII. Id.
The defendant law partnership moved for dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for which relief might be granted. Id. at 125; see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(l), 12(b)(6). The court found that the complaint stated a cause of action under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and denied the motion to dismiss. Lucido, 425 F. Supp. at 129.
The court ruled that discrimination, based on religion and national origin, which effectively denied
an associate employee access to a partnership position, subjected the law firm to liability for breach
of contract and violation of Title VII. Id. at 129. The Lucido court cited Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co. Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971), in
interpreting Title VII as effectuating congressional intent to eliminate discrimination in employment.
Lucido, 425 F. Supp. at 126.
The federal district court in Hishon evaded Lucido by labeling its controlling arguments as dicta.
Hishon, 678 F.2d 1022, 1029 (11 th Cir. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). The
court of appeals stated that Lucido was not binding precedent within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh
Circuit. Id. at 1029. Lucido, however, is directly on point with Hishon.
6. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1028. The Eleventh Circuit refused to allow Title VII coverage to encroach
upon individuals' decisions to associate voluntarily in a business partnership. Id.
The court based its reasoning on the underlying principles of partnership law. Under the Uniform
Partnership Act, "partnership" is defined as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners [of] a business for profit." 6 U.L.A. § 6(1) (Supp. 1978). See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 541-2, -6 (1978). New Mexico, like most states, has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act's definition
of "partnership." Id. Note, however, that Georgia statutes provide no definition of partnership. See
Ga. Stat. Ann. § 14-8-1 (1981). Thus, generally speaking, a partnership is the result of the voluntary
association of two or more persons. See Howard, Hishon v. King & Spalding: Should Partnerships
Be Excluded From The Constraints of Title VII? 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 189, 199 (1984).
Under the voluntary association theory, a partnership neither occurs by accident nor by mistake,
nor is it a relationship imposed upon two or more persons, regardless of their consent. See id. at
199. The theory of voluntary association constitutes one of the fundamental principles of partnership
law. See id. at 190 n.3. See also F. BURDICK, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS 5-8 (1983) (voluntary
association is the underlying essence of partnership law).
The Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the voluntary association theory reinforced the existing legitimate concern that professional partnerships could avoid Title VII's discrimination prohibitions by
utilizing their status as voluntary associations. See Howard, supra, at 190.
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not discount the voluntary association theory of partnership law. 7 The
mandate, however, does impose upon partnerships a prohibition against
discriminatory employment practices.8
This Note analyzes the Hishon decision and examines the purpose of
Title VII and the extent of its reach to partnership employers. The Note
also discusses the effect of the Court's mandate upon the opportunities
for women and other minorities within the partnership structure. Finally,
the Note proffers steps that law firms may take to minimize the threat of
increased litigation resulting from discrimination charges.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1972, Elizabeth Hishon accepted an associate position with King &
Spalding, a Georgia-based law partnership.9 Seven years later, when King
& Spalding decided not to invite Hishon into the partnership, the firm
terminated her employment under its "up or out" policy.' Hishon filed
a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming that King & Spalding had discriminated against
her on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."
After the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue, 2 Hishon brought suit
7. See Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2236 (1984) (Powell J., concurring), discussed infra notes 73-74
and accompanying text.
8. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2236.
9. Id. at 2232. King & Spalding is a large Atlanta-based law firm operating as a general partnership.
Id. The firm has over 60 partners and employs approximately 60 associates. Martindale-Hubbell,
Law Directory, 350, 1728B-1735B (1984). At the time of Hishon's discharge, the firm had been in
existence for 94 years. Martindale-Hubbell at 1729B. During that period, no woman ever became
a partner in the firm. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2232. When the firm hired Hishon in 1972, she became
the second female ever employed by King & Spalding. Howard, supra note 6, at 191 n.8. The first
woman associate was hired in 1933 and remained an associate until her retirement in 1977. Id. In
1980, after Hishon had left the firm, King & Spalding admitted the first woman into the partnership.
Tybor, What "Up or Out" Means to Women Lawyers, 69 A.B.A.J. 756, 759 (1983); see also
Howard, supra note 6, at 191 n.8.
10. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1024. Under an "up or out" policy, associates must either become
partners at the end of a specified time period or locate employment elsewhere. See Howard, supra
note 6, at 191. King & Spalding uses a six-year internship period. Id. Once an associate is denied
partnership status by the firm, the associate is given notice of discharge. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2232.
The firm grants the associate a reasonable period of time to secure other employment. Howard,
supra note 6, at 191. Hishon received termination notification at the end of her six-year internship.
Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1024. Eight months later, Hishon requested the firm to reconsider her for partner
status. Id. The partnership reaffirmed the discharge at an associate review meeting in May, 1979.
In line with the "up or out" policy, Hishon's employment with King & Spalding terminated on
December 31, 1979. Hishon 104 S. Ct. at 2232. The "up or out" policy practiced by King &
Spalding exists in almost all large law firms. Zarefsky, How the Hishon Decision Will Affect Your
Firm, 70 A.B.A.J. 58, 59 (Sept. 1984).
11.Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2232.
12. Pursuant to regulatory provisions of Title VII, a party must exhaust state and local administrative remedies and file a timely charge with the EEOC before pursuing Title VII litigation. See
29 C.F.R. § 1601.70 (1982). In a state without any agency to enforce a statute or ordinance against
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against the firm in federal district court for violation of Title VII. '"Hishon
claimed that King & Spalding used the possibility of ultimate partnership
as a recruiting device to induce her and other young lawyers to become
associates at the firm. 4 She contended that the firm represented advancement to partnership after five or six years as a matter of course for
associates. 5 She also alleged that the firm represented consideration for
partnership as an employment activity which would be conducted on a
fair and equal basis.' 6 Hishon claimed that she relied on the firm's representations regarding advancement to partnership when she accepted
employment with the firm. 7 She further alleged that King & Spalding's
promise to consider her on a fair and equal basis created a binding
employment contract. " Finally, she claimed that King & Spalding discriminated against her on the basis of her gender when it failed to invite
her to become a partner. 9
The federal district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.2" The court held that Title VII was inapplicable to the
selection of partners by a partnership. 2' The court based its holding on
the theory that partnership decisions are protected by the constitutional
right of freedom of association.22

On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.23 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded.4 The court deteremployment discrimination, a Title VII charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e). If the EEOC decides not to sue on behalf of the
charging party, the EEOC issues a notice of right to sue to the party. Id.at § 2000e-5(f).
Hishon filed her charge with the EEOC on November 19, 1979. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2232. Ten
days later the EEOC issued the notice of right to sue. Id.
The timeliness of Hishon's filing with the EEOC was in dispute. See id. at 2232 n. 1. King &
Spalding claimed that the 180 day filing period had expired prior to her filing with the EEOC. Id.
at 2232. However, the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
made it unnecessary for the court to decide the timeliness issue. Id.
13. The complaint filed with the federal district court contained three causes of action. The first
count alleged sex discrimination in the firm's decision not to make her a partner. Hishon, 678 F.2d
at 1025 n.4. Count Two alleged violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1963). Count Three alleged breach of contract. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1025 n.5. Counts Two and
Three were informally withdrawn by Hishon and dismissed without prejudice. Id.at 1025. Thus,
the only issue before the district court concerned the threshold jurisdictional question of whether
Title VII applied to the partnership decision.
14. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2232.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1301, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
21. Id.
22. Id.at 1306.
23. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1022.
24. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2232.
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mined that Hishon's complaint stated a cognizable claim under Title VII. 5
The Court held that in appropriate circumstances partnership consideration
may qualify as a "term, condition, or privilege of a person's employment"
within the meaning of Title VII. 26
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In determining that Hishon's complaint stated a cognizable claim under
Title VII and thereby granting Hishon the opportunity to prove her allegation, the Court necessarily addressed four issues. The Court first
construed Title VII's purpose and scope as they related to the King &
Spalding partnership.27 Second, the Court examined the agreements and
representations necessary to establish that the opportunity for "advancement" to partner was a "term, condition, or privilege" of the employment
contract with the partnership.2 Third, the Court scrutinized the requirements necessary for a "benefit" to qualify as a "term, condition, or
privilege" of the employment relationship, even when the "benefit" is
only a non-contractual privilege of employment.2 9 Finally, the Court addressed the constitutionality of subjecting partnership consideration and
selection to Title VII scrutiny.3 °
A. Title VII: Purpose and Scope
The passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 marked the
beginning of congressional efforts to combat employment discrimination. 3 The federal statute expressly deems it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against an individual on the basis
of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 3 2 The statute explicitly
includes partnerships in the definition of employer for purposes of Title
VII coverage." Partnerships which qualify as employers under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b), therefore, are expressly prohibited by statute from engaging
in invidious discriminatory employment practices. This express statutory
language formed the basis of the Court's determination that if King &
25. Id. at 2235 n. 10, 2236. See supra note 2 for pertinent Title VII statutory provisions. See also
infra note 33 for the statutory definition of "employers" for purposes of Title VII.
26. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2235, n.10.
27. Id. at 2233.
28. Id. at 2233-35.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2235.
31. Bartholet, supra note 4, at 949.
32. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for the express statutory prohibition against employment discrimination.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) defines an "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who employs fifteen or more employees for each working day of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.
Subsection 2000e(a)'s definition of "person"
includes "partnerships."
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Spalding qualified as employers under Title VII, the firm's employment
practices would fall within the strictures of Title VI."
B. Promotion Opportunities:Terms, Conditions, or Privileges of
Employment
Section 2000e-2(a)(l) of Title VII provides that an employer may not
discriminate against an employee with respect to the "terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment."" The Court recognized the broad sweep
of the language of this provision in ruling that the representation of
opportunity to become a partner in King & Spalding could constitute a
term, condition, or privilege of Hishon's employment at the firm. 6 The
Court reasoned that when the underlying employment relationship is contractual, the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment include all
benefits that are a part of the employment contract.37 Under the Court's
rationale, evidence showing a contractual agreement to consider Hishon
34. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2233. Title VII's legislative history unequivocally supports the court's
finding that law partnerships are subject to Title VII scrutiny. Congress included in the objectives
of Title VII the elimination of job discrimination in professional fields, including law and medicine.
Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Congress rejected
proposed amendments designed to exclude partnerships, business organizations, and the professional
fields from Title VII scrutiny. See S. 2515, 92 Cong., 2nd Sess., 118 Cong. Rec. 3802 (1972).
Congress also failed to adopt a 1972 proposed amendment designed to exclude physicians and
surgeons employed by public or private hospitals from Title VII. In support of the amendment's
defeat, Senator Javits stated:
One of the things that those discriminated against have resented the most is that
they are relegated to the position of the sawers of wood and the drawers of water:
that only the blue collar jobs and ditchdigging jobs are reserved for them; and
that though they built America, and certainly helped build it enormously in the
days of its basic construction, they cannot ascend the higher rungs in professional
and other life.
S. 2515 92 Cong., 2nd Sess., 118 Cong. Rec. 3802 (1972).
In defense of another unsuccessful amendment designed to limit Title VII coverage to businesses
with 100 or more employees, Senator Cotton stated that "[wihen a small businessman who employs
30 or 25 or 26 persons selects an employee, he comes very close to selecting a partner; and when
a businessman selects a partner, he comes dangerously close to the situation he faces when he selects
a wife." Id. The senator's tasteless and ill-constructed analogy clearly was designed to convince
Congress that partnership consideration and selection should be excluded from Title VII protection.
Congress, however, rejected that argument by defeating the proposed amendment.
Congress' intentional inclusion of partnerships and the professional fields within the purview of
Title VII demonstrates that Congress intended Title VII coverage to extend to employment practices
at all levels of the job market, including law partnerships and other business partnerships in general.
Had Congress meant otherwise, it no doubt would have expressly exempted partnerships, as it did
Indian tribes, certain agencies of the District of Columbia, small businesses, bona fide private
membership clubs, and certain employees of religious organizations. See 42 U.S.C. at §§ 2000e(b)( 1),
e(b)(2), and e-1.While Congress at one time did exempt certain employees of educational institutions,
it later revoked that exemption. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat.
255 (1964); the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat.
103, 103-04 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1976)).
35. See supra note 2 for full text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).
36. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2233.
37. Id.
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for partnership would establish the promise as a term, condition, or
privilege of her employment.38 Title VII would then attach, binding King
& Spalding to consider Hishon for partnership in accordance with the
statutory provisions regarding discrimination. 39
Other courts have adopted similar broad interpretations of Title VII's
statutory language. Some of these courts have read the statutory language
of Title VII as an indication of congressional intent both to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms and to include the entire scope
of the working environment within the Act's protective ambit.' That
ambit clearly includes terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.'
Hishon alleged that King & Spalding had used as a recruiting device
the promise to consider her for partnership at the completion of her
associate apprenticeship.42 She contended that during hiring negotiations
King & Spalding had represented that partnership advancement after five
or six years was a "matter of course" for associates who received satisfactory evaluations. 43 Hishon further claimed that the firm had assured
her that associates were promoted to partnership "on a fair and equal
basis. "' Hishon thus argued that the promise of partnership consideration,
supported by the firm's representations, was a term, condition, or privilege of her employment relation with the firm.4"
King & Spalding, however, contended that advancement to partnership
could never qualify, for Title VII purposes, as a term, condition, or
privilege of employment.46 The firm asserted that elevation to partnership
47
status entailed a change in status from "employee" to "employer."
King & Spalding based its argument on the theory that because a part38. Id. at 2234.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
The NLRB alleged that the defendant unlawfully failed to promote an employee to a supervisory
position. Id. at 236. The defendant claimed that because supervisory positions were not within Title
VlI's definition of "employee," the denial of promotion to a supervisory position could not be a
violation of the statute. The court rejected the argument stating:
At the time the discrimination took place he was clearly a protected employee,
and his prospects for promotion were among the conditions of his employment.
The Act protected him so long as he held a nonsupervisory position, and it is
immaterial that the protection thereby afforded was calculated to enable him to
obtain a position in which he would no longer be protected.
Id. at 237. A discussion of BellAircraft is found in Note, Hishon v. King & Spalding:May Partners
Elude Title VII When ConsideringAssociatesfor Partnership?32 U. KAN. L. REV. 250, 262 (1984).
See also Golden State Bottling Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 414 U.S. 168, 188 (1973);
Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
41. See Lucido, 425 F. Supp. at 126.
42. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2232.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2233.
46. Id. at 2235.
47. Id.
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nership invitation is not in itself an offer of employment, it cannot constitute a term, condition, or privilege of employment.4"
The Court flatly rejected King & Spalding's "employee/employer"
dichotomy. Relying on the express language of section 2000e-2(a), the
Court reasoned that a benefit need not constitute employment to fall within
Title VII's protection; it need only be a term, condition, or privilege of
employment.49 The Court found it of no consequence that employment
as an associate necessarily ends when an associate becomes a partner.5
Instead, the Court found that a benefit need not accrue before a person's
employment is completed to be a term, condition, or privilege of the
employment relationship. 5 Relying on prior decisions, the Court found
that nothing entailed in the change in status from associate to partner
would place the partnership outside the terms of Title VII's mandates.52
The Court concluded that the express promise of partnership consideration in a contractual situation constituted a term, condition, or privilege
of the employment.53 The Court further reasoned that once a contractual
relation is established, the contractual obligation triggers Title VII protection regarding promises and representations that are a part of the employment contract." Once Title VII attaches, the employer may not
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national
origin. 5
Based on this rationale, the Court concluded that should evidence at
trial establish a contractual agreement to consider Hishon for partnership,
the promise would clearly be a term, condition, or privilege of her employment contract." If the promise were a term of the contractual agree48. Id. King & Spalding apparently based its theory on the notion that a partnership invitation
is not an employment promotion. Rather, it is a business offer to terminate employee status and
become a partner in ownership, thereby acquiring employer status.
49. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2235. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
express statutory language on which the Court based its reasoning.
50. Id.
51. Id. To support its position, the Court relied on its prior reasoning "in Arizona Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073
(1983). In Norris, the Supreme Court found that pension benefits qualified as terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment even though they were received only after employment terminated. Id. at
1089.
52. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2235. See e.g., (citing Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1089 (1983)). Lucido
also supports the Hishon Court's reasoning. 425 F. Supp. at 128. The Lucido court stated:
The opportunity to be promoted to a position not itself covered by Title VII does
not mean that discrimination in that promotion cannot be protected by Title VII.
In fact, the opportunity to be considered for a job not covered by Title VII can
itself be a "term, condition, or privilege of employment" and/or "employment
opportunity."
Lucido, 425 F. Supp. at 128 (citing Bell Aircraft, 206 F.2d 235 and Golden State, 414 U.S. 168).
53. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2234.
54. Id. at 2233.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2234.
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ment, denial of partnership on the basis of Hishon's gender would violate
Title VII's provisions. The Court thus held that Hishon's assertions set
forth a cognizable Title VII claim for relief. 7
C. Benefits: Privileges of the Employment Relationship
After Hishon, there remains no doubt that a contractual promise of
partnership consideration falls within the purview of Title VII. In addition,
the Hishon Court ruling clearly establishes that partnership consideration
opportunities may trigger Title VII protection irrespective of the existence
of a contractual obligation."
The Court analyzed Hishon's opportunity for partnership consideration
as a benefit which qualified as a privilege of her employment at King &
Spalding. 9 The Court noted that an employer is free to provide its employees with many benefits that it is under neither express nor implied
contractual obligation to furnish." While such a benefit is not a contractual
right of employment, the Court found that when the benefit is a privilege
of employment, Title VII governs.6"
The Court stated that to qualify as a privilege for Title VII purposes
the benefit must comprise an incident of the employment or form an
aspect of the relationship between the employer and employee.62 In either
case, a benefit qualifying as a privilege under Title VII may not be afforded
in a manner contrary to the statute.63
The Hishon Court concluded that consideration for partnership was a
privilege normally afforded associates at King & Spalding. The privilege,
therefore, was "part and parcel" of the associates' employment relationship with the law firm.64 The Court held that such a benefit "may not be
doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free
65
under the employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all."
After Hishon, partnership employers must recognize this as the rule regarding partnership consideration promises.
D. Constitutionality of Subjecting PartnershipSelection Decisions to
Title VII Scrutiny
In response to Hishon's Title VII claim, King & Spalding challenged
the application of Title VII to partnership selection decisions on first
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 2236.
Id. at 2235.
Id. at 2234. See also Zarefsky, supra note 10, at 58.
Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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amendment grounds.' The Supreme Court, however, found no basis for
upholding the firm's contention that application of Title VII would infringe
upon King & Spalding's constitutional rights of free expression and association.67
The Court relied on its previous holding in another context in Norwood
v. Harrisonto reject King & Spalding's constitutional argument.6 8 The
issue before the Norwood Court concerned the constitutionality of a state
government providing assistance to a racially segregated private school.69
Adopting the language in Norwood, the Hishon Court stated that although
"[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, ...
it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections." 70 Without further analysis, the Court used the right to attend a private school
or to join a labor union as an example of its point regarding constitutional
protection of invidious private discrimination under the guise of freedom
of association. 7' The Court stated that "[t]here is no constitutional right
. . . to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school
or join a labor union." 72
The rationale adopted by the Hishon Court regarding King & Spalding's
first amendment challenge indicates that the Court viewed the firm's
association with Hishon as strictly voluntary.73 The Court failed to see
how enforcement of the voluntary obligation to consider her for partnership on her merits would impair the firm's right of association. 74 Based
on this reasoning, the Court arguably viewed King & Spalding's initial
voluntary hiring of Hishon as an exercise of the firm's right of association.
Once the firm voluntarily hired Hishon, consideration of her for partnership based on merit could not impair a constitutional right already
exercised.
66. Id. at 2235.
67. Id.
68. Id.(citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973)).
69. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 457. In Norwood, parents of school children brought a class action
suit to enjoin state officials from loaning state-owned text books to children attending racially
segregated private schools in Mississippi. The Norwood Court stated that " [r]acial discrimination in
state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution." Id. at 465. The Court added that "[ilt
is also
axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage, or promote private persons to accomplish what
is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish." Id.at 465 (quoting Lee v. Macon Co. Bd. of Ed., 267
F. Supp. 458, 475-76 (M.D. Ala. 1967)). The Norwood Court, therefore, held that a state's loaning
text books to students attending racially discriminatory private schools was unconstitutional. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465-66.
70. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470).
71. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
72. Id.(citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326
U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945)).
73. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
74. Id.
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IV. IMPACT: A NARROW DECISION WITH BROAD IMPLICATIONS

A. Hishon's Narrow Holding
While the unanimous Court accorded Title VII's statutory language a
liberal interpretation, it narrowly held that partnership consideration decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny.7" The Court expressly restricted its holding to apply only in appropriate circumstances where
partnership consideration qualifies as a term, condition, or privilege of
employment.76 The restrictive nature of the holding extends Title VII
coverage only to certain law firm partnerships and only then under certain
circumstances.
The Hishon decision does not extend to all partnerships, as the Title
VII mandate relied on by the Court eliminates small business partnerships
from statutory scrutiny.77 Rather, Hishon reaches only those partnerships
large enough to qualify under Title VII as employers. The statute excludes
as employers small business partnerships that employ fourteen or fewer
individuals or that employ fifteen or more people for each working day
but for a period less than twenty calendar weeks in the current or preceding
year.7" Small law firms, therefore, are not directly affected by Hishon.
As is noted later, however, the Hishon decision may indirectly affect even
the smaller firms that technically are outside Title VII's prohibitive ambit.7 9
Hishon did lay to rest any doubt regarding larger law firms' accountability as partnership employers. The ruling does not, however, extend
80
to the overall management decisions rendered by these firms. Nor does
8' Rather, Hishon
the ruling apply to every partnership selection decision.
applies only to those partnership selection decisions where an associate
within the firm is considered for elevation from the rank of employee to
partner."
75. Id. at 2235 n.10.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2233 n.3. Generally, Title VII regulates individuals, partnerships, and other entities
employing 15 or more individuals on a regular basis. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for
discussion about to whom Title VII applies. See also Zarefsky, supra note 10, at 58.
78. See supra note 32.
79. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. All business firms, regardless of their size, are
subject to suit for breach of contract.
80. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2236 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 2233-34. See also Zarefsky, supra note 10, at 59.
82. Id. The restrictive nature of the Court's ruling renders Hishon too narrow to encompass a
firm's lateral selection of partners. See Zarefsky, supra note 10, at 59. An "outsider" is not an
employee of the selecting firm. It logically follows that the "outsider" vying for a lateral partnership
position cannot raise a Title VII claim that consideration for partnership selection was a term,
condition, or privilege of employment. Id. While an "outsider" may have cause for a claim on other
grounds, the individual is precluded, under the Hishon ruling, from making a Title VII claim that
consideration for partnership selection constituted part of an employment agreement. See id.
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While the Court's ruling does grant associates within a firm Title VII
protection regarding partnership consideration, such protection does not
necessarily extend to every associate employed by a firm. Rather, Hishon
applies only to the associate who can claim that consideration for partnership was either a contractual benefit or a non-contractual privilege of
employment.8 3 Without such a basis for a claim, under Hishon, an associate within a firm does not enjoy Title VII protection regarding potential
partnership selection.
The Hishon Court's narrow ruling does define which partnerships are
subject to Title VII scrutiny and under what circumstances. The nature
of the Hishon case, however, precluded the Court from rendering a decision broad enough to control employment discrimination cases that find
their way into the courts by virtue of the Hishon ruling.8 4 As a result,
the Hishon decision, in and of itself, will not affect the merits of a Title
VII partnership selection discrimination claim.
The Court's ruling merely established that partnerships may be accountable under Title VII for partnership selection decisions. The ruling
does not set forth any guidelines for an associate to utilize in attempting
to overcome the often-times insurmountable burden of proving the discrimination charges in a disparate treatment action.8 5
Because discrimination is by its nature a slippery question of fact, the
employer is always at an advantage in discrimination cases. The employer
needs only to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection.86 The employee, however, must then show that
the employer's articulated reason is a pretext for intentional discrimi83. See Zarefsky, supra note 10, at 59.
84. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. The issue before the Court was limited to the
jurisdictional scope of Title VII. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2233. The Court's ruling, therefore, was
procedural rather than substantive. Id. The holding merely granted Hishon the opportunity to have
her case heard on its merits. The decision did not reach the merits of the case.
85. Individual cases of intentional gender discrimination are called "disparate treatment" claims.
B.L. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 13 (1983). To proceed with a disparate
treatment claim, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The ultimate factor at issue is intent to discriminate; thus, proof of
discriminatory motive is required, although in the usual circumstances it is inferred from differences
in treatment. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-43 (1977).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden
shifts to the defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The defendant, however, does not have to prove
that the real reason for rejection was the articulated reason. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that once the defendant articulates
any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken, the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the articulated, nondiscriminatory reason was merely pretext. Id. Burdine makes
it clear that the burden of persuasion in a disparate treatment case is always with the plaintiff.
The Hishon decision neither overrules nor modifies Burdine. Under Burdine the plaintiff is granted
"full and fair opportunity" to demonstrate pretext. Id. at 258. In essence, Burdine allows a plaintiff
to retain a key to the door, but virtually nails the door shut.
86. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
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nation. 8 7 The Hishon decision will not affect the outcome of future discrimination claims under Title VII which are heard on their merits. As a
result, while partnership employers must recognize that their employment
practices are not immune to Title VII coverage, they, like other employerdefendants, retain an advantage over employees in discrimination suits.
The procedural posture of the case prevented the Court from estab8
lishing a standard for judicial review of partnership selection cases.
Hishon may in fact encourage courts to adopt the course of deference
traditionally afforded institutions of higher learning regarding academic
freedom and tenured positions." Such deference, however, is questionable in both the academic and legal professions.'
Public policy warrants a strict standard of review of employment discrimination decisions, especially in the area of law partnerships and institutions of higher learning. Because of the nature of high-level employment
in these areas, pretextual business necessity often shields non-legitimate
discrimination. Further, lawyers are aware of the loopholes in the law
and can readily take advantage of others possessing less expertise.
As conservators of the law, the courts should be compelled to prevent
such injustice. Hishon narrowly but emphatically prohibits law partnerships from discriminating against certain associates. The courts must
assume the responsibility of enforcing the law emanating from Hishon.
Implementing anything short of a strict standard of review will render
Hishon not only narrow but also meaningless.
B. Hishon's Broad Reach
While the Hishon decision is narrow in its scope, it is broad in its
potential to affect substantially employment opportunities for women and
87. Id. at 253, 256.
88. Hishon, 104 S.Ct. at 2237 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). The case was not heard on its merits.
See supra notes 21-26, 84 and accompanying text. The Court, therefore, did not establish a standard
of review to be applied in hearing the case on its merits.
89. Many judges have routinely declined to intervene in the decision-making process regarding
high-level positions in academia on the grounds that they are unqualified to make such decisions
for educational institutions. See Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
In his concurring Hishon opinion, Justice Powell's comment regarding judicial review of academic
cases may indicate that the courts are likely to adopt a deferential standard of review when examining
private decisions that are an exercise of the right of association. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2237 n.4
(Powell, J., concurring). Powell noted that "the courts of appeals generally have acknowledged that
respect for academic freedom requires some deference to the judgment of schools . . . as to the
qualifications of professors, particularly those considered for tenured positions." Id. The courts may
apply this same deferential review treatment to partnership selection cases, out of respect for the
judgment of law firms as to the qualifications of associates considered for partnership status. See
id. at 2236-37 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Judges cannot plead ignorance in the field of law. They are members of the law profession.
They, more than anyone, are in a position to scrutinize the activities that transpire within the legal
profession. Because of their knowledge of the field, members of the judicial community should hold
the legal profession to a strict standard of review.
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other minorities within the partnership structure. At least two theories for
causes of action issue from the Court's mandate. 9' One theory emanating
from Hishon is embedded in Title VII's strictures against discrimination.9 2
The other theory encompasses breach of contract. Both theories support
the proposition that, under Hishon, partnership employers may not arbitrarily deny women and other minorities access to high-level professional positions.93
1. Title VII Violations
Title VII's reach encompasses more than just gender discrimination.94
The statute also expressly prohibits discrimination based on race, color,
religion, and national origin.95 The Court's ruling, therefore, extends not
only to women, but also to blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities historically excluded from many mainstream law firms and traditionally
denied the opportunity to reach the top echelon employment positions in
the professional fields. 96 After Hishon, partnership firms qualifying as
employers under Title VII may no longer arbitrarily discriminate against
women and other minorities under the guise of their classification as
voluntary associates.97
2. Breach of Contract
Prior to Hishon, law partnerships with "up or out" policies could
arbitrarily deny partnership status to associates and then terminate their
employment for failure to become a partner.9 8 Hishon indirectly alleged
that this very procedure led to her termination of employment at King &
Spalding. 9 The Hishon Court ruled that Hishon stated both a Title VII
discrimination claim and a breach of contract claim. " The Court reasoned
91. Schachter, Wrongful DischargeAfter 'Hishon', 7 Nat'l L.J. 14 (1984).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See supranote 2 for the complete statutory list of types of discriminations prohibited by Title
VII.
95. Id.
96. Zarefsky, supra note 10, at 60.
97. This, of course, does not mean that every Title VII claim challenging the partnership selection
process will be victorious in the courts. It merely means that when a Title VII claim is properly
used to challenge a partnership selection decision, the Hishon mandate requires that the process be
thoroughly scrutinized in light of Title VII. Women and other minorities are most frequently the
individuals with cause to challenge the partnership selection process. See Amicus Curiae Brief of
the Women's Bar Associations of Illinois and New York at 18-19, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104
S. Ct. 2229 (1984); Brief of Petitioner at 18-23, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229
(1984). Hishon provides them with needed artillery for waging their war against arbitrary denial of
access to the top echelon in the professional fields. See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 948-49.
98. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of how "up or out" policies
generally work.
99. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2232.
100. Id. at 2234, 2236.
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that the express promise to consider Hishon for partnership selection was
a term, condition, or privilege of her employment contract."'0 Hishon
states that "the contract of employment may be written or oral, formal
or informal; an informal contract of employment may arise by the simple
act of handing a job applicant a shovel and providing a workplace.'"'02
Thus, the Court's recognition that contracts may be either written or
implied effectively placed King & Spalding squarely among employers
who are subject to claims for breach of express or implied contracts. 03
In many states, employers may not arbitrarily terminate employees in
violation of the employees' express or implied contractual rights. " Absent
a showing of termination for "good cause,"'0 " such terminations give
rise to wrongful discharge claims."
In light of the Court's recognition of Hishon's implied and express
contractual rights, law partnership employers who use partnership selection as a recruitment device will be held accountable for their promises
and representations. Hishon requires that the courts closely scrutinize
reasons given for denial of partnership status. The denial cannot be for
reasons °7 nor arguably for any other reason short of "good
discriminatory
08
cause."
As a result, law firms operating under "up or out" policies may no
longer arbitrarily deny an associate partnership status and then terminate
the associate for failure to make partnership. The doctrine of implied
contractual rights requires that the associate's consideration for partner101. Id. at 2233.
102. Id.
103. Schachter, supra note 91, at 14.
104. Id.
105. See Cleary v. American Airlines Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d. 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
In Cleary, an employee alleged that the company's grievance and discharge policies were part of
an oral contract not to discharge him wrongfully. Id. at 446, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 723. The company
discharged the employee without the hearing required under the company's grievance procedure.
Id. at 447-48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724. The employee claimed that the company breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in his contract. Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
The court held that not only did the defendant have to follow its internal procedures but that it was
also required to show "good cause" before the employee's contract could be terminated. Id. at 456,
168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
"Good cause" has been defined as a "fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith
on the part of the party exercising the power." Pugh v. See's Candies,. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981). The Pugh court, however, also recognized that where an employee
"occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must be allowed substantial
scope for the exercise of subjective judgment." Id. However, terminations resulting from subjective
judgment regarding sensitive managerial or confidential positions are not likely to be upheld by the
courts when such terminations are in violation of public policy. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509, 514 (N.J. 1980); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151,
153-54 (Mich. 1956).
106. Schachter, supra note 91, at 14.
107. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
108. Schachter, supra note 91, at 14.
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ship status be conducted according to the contractual agreement."t 0 The
doctrine further requires that denial can only be based on "good cause." " 0
If "good cause" cannot be demonstrated, denial of partnership status
under these circumstances, constitutes a breach of contract."'
V. LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF HISHON
It is too soon to determine the impact the Hishon decision will have
upon litigation following in its wake. It seems probable, however, that
law firms may be subject to increased litigation brought on by employees
with both legitimate and spurious claims. Any increase in litigation,
however, is less likely to result from Title VII claims than from breach
of contract claims.
A. Title VII Claims
After Hishon, associates with cognizable Title VII claims against partnership employers for discrimination in the partnership selection have
greater access to the courts to air their discrimination claims. This factor
alone may serve to encourage previously reluctant individuals to file
complaints against their partnership employers. Due to the difficulty in
proving discrimination charges, however, it is doubtful that Title VII
violation claims will increase significantly. 2 The difficulty of proving
discrimination, coupled with the distinct likelihood of deferential judicial
review, may serve as a check on any substantial increase in litigation
arising out of Hishon's Title VII ruling." 3
B. Breach of Contract Claims
The Court's application of employment contract principles may well
result in increased litigation for breach of implied contracts based on oral
statements. "' The majority of the states have wrongful discharge laws,
and the other states are likely, in time, to follow this legal trend." 5 Thus,
law firms, even small law firms that are immune to discrimination claims,
are certainly more susceptible to breach of contract and wrongful dis109. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
110. Schachter, supra note 91, at 14. See also Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329-30, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
111. This is true in approximately 24 states that uphold wrongful-discharge claims arising out of
a contractual theory. Schachter, supra note 91, at 14. Further, the Hishon Court's recognition of
Title VII's application to a contractual right indicates that termination resulting from invidious
discrimination is both contrary to the "good cause" doctrine and unlawful.
112. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
114. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
115. Schachter, supra note 91, at 14.
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charge claims." 6 All law partnership employers must realize this everpresent potential for liability and should conduct the partnership selection
process in a manner designed to avoid such liability.
Preventative measures are available to keep litigation at a minimum in
the wake of Hishon. Firms must operate in accordance with Title VII.
To do so requires that "in-house" associates be considered for partnership
status solely on the basis of their qualifications. The implementation of
an objective evaluation system that takes into account the necessary subjective factors will provide partnership employers with an operative documentation tool for measuring performance, productivity, and overall
partnership status qualifications. In addition, associates should be given
the opportunity to perform the tasks and demonstrate the qualities measured by the evaluation criteria.
If the evaluation process comports with an earnest attempt to discourage
discrimination, employer self-analysis should also be part of the procedure. These steps may not prevent an employee from filing a discrimination claim, but they will certainly minimize the likelihood of such
challenges. Further, they will provide the employer with a thoroughly
documented defense against charges of intentional discrimination.
Moreover, firms are also well-advised to use written employment agreements, specifying clearly the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Further, firms should take precautionary steps to assure that
oral promises and representations comport with the express written contractual agreement. Employers must also take additional steps to avoid
granting some associates non-contractual employment benefits that are
denied other associates. Extreme effort is warranted for clarifying any
ambiguities regarding the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Finally, the easiest and best way for firms to avoid litigation in the
wake of Hishon is to treat all their associates fairly and reasonably. Such
equal treatment recognizes that neither gender, race, nor any other form
of invidious discrimination is relevant in partnership selection decisions.
As Justice Powell stated in his concurring opinion in Hishon:
The qualities of mind, capacity to reason logically, ability to work
under pressure, leadership and the like are unrelated to race and sex.
This is demonstrated by the success of women and minorities in law
schools, in the practice of law, on the bench, and in positions of
community, state and national leadership. Law firms-and, of course,
society-are the better for these changes. "7
116. Id.
117. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2237 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Law firms that are willing to operate lawfully and fairly while fulfilling
their contractual obligations have little reason to be concerned about a
parade of horribles emanating from Hishon. These firms, most likely,
will not be subject to increased employment discrimination liability.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Hishon decision places law partnerships squarely among the business organizations that are subject to employment-oriented laws. Most
important, however, Hishon serves to remind lawyers of their professional
responsibilities.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers not only to
take an active role in seeking justice, but also to set examples for society." 8
Nothing is more inappropriate than for one who, by profession, seeks
justice to be unjust. The Hishon decision asks lawyers, as it asks others,
to conform to ethical obligations so important that they have been made
law by way of Title VII. Hishon mandates that lawyers conform to the
law when acting in concert with others in a partnership relation for the
purpose of conducting a profit-making business. As the plight of women
and other minorities within the partnership structure has revealed, the
Hishon decision was long overdue.
SANDI GILLEY

118. ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preamble and Canon 8 (1981).

